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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
SUPREME COURT #920104
#920087-CA
#901502200

V

JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal for an Interlocutory Order of the Fifth Judicial District Court
In and for the County of Washington, State of Utah
Honorable J. Philip Eves, Presiding
The Defendant/Appellant, Joseph Charles Gardner, Jr., by and through counsel,
Alan D. Boyack, submits the following brief in support of it's petition for review of the Order
of the Honorable J. Philip Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington County,
State of Utah.
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JURISDICTION

The Appellant in this case is in jeopardy of capital punishment, and therefore, jurisdiction
is exclusive,to the Supreme Court of Utah. In addition thereto, the Utah Court of Appeals has
certified this case to the Utah Supreme Court. (See Appendix 1)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Was the order of the Honorable J. Philip Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court
incorrect in allowing the legal standard of the defense of involuntary intoxication
to be incorporated into the defense of insanity in accordance with §76-2-305(1)
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended?

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORIAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

§76-305-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended.
Mental illness - Use as a defense - Influence of alcohol or other substance
voluntarily consumed - Definition.
It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant,
as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the
offense charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.
Colorado Statute CRS 18-1-804.
...a person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if by reason of intoxication
that is not self-induced at the time he acts, he lacks the capacity to perform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.

5

STATEMENT OF CASE
In the early morning hours of July 22, 1990, the Appellant, Joseph Charles Gardner, Jr.,
fired a fatal shot killing one Janice Fondren in her apartment located in St. George, Utah. At the
time of the shooting, Appellant was unauthorized to be in the Fondren apartment.
As the prosecution and the defense prepared their respective cases, it became apparent that
a central issue of the defense would be Involuntary Intoxication. By prescription, Appellant had
been using a medication known generically as Fluoxetine, manufactured by Eli Lily and marketed
to the medical profession under the trade name Prozac.
By way of mutual stipulation, both the defense and the prosecution requested that the
Fifth Judicial District Court order the Appellant examined to see what effect, if any, psychotropic
drugs in general and Prozac specifically had on the Appellant.
During the period of examination which had been extended by the Utah State Hospital,
Appellant was found by the Court to be incompetent to stand trial. The Appellant was in
incompetency status for approximately one year, when both the prosecution and the defense
requested that the director of the Utah State Hospital Forensic Unit evaluate the Appellant's
competency status. After the second evaluation, Appellant was found competent to stand trial.
Both the prosecution and the defense submitted to the Fifth Judicial District Court briefs
as to the legal standard of Involuntary Intoxication in the State of Utah. On January 8, 1992, the
District Court ruled, essentially, that the standard for Involuntary Intoxication would be, for all
practical purposes, the same as the standard for the insanity defense. (See Appendix 2)
Plea negotiations then took place, and it was agreed that the Appellant would enter a
conditional plea to the crime of murder, conditioned upon his right to appeal to the Utah Supreme
6

Court the District Court's finding on the legal standard of Involuntary Intoxication. In exchange
for the Appellant's plea of guilty, the State would not request the imposition of the death penalty.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Should the lack of a culpable mens rea, where the criminal acts of the actor are the direct
and proximate result of a chemical substance administered through a physician, be excused?
The State and the District Court have answered in the negative, unless the acts of the
actor rise to the level of the standard articulated in §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
Amended.
Appellant takes no exception whatsoever to the proposition that the standard of insanity
defense is precisely as articulated in §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended.
Respondent concedes that §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended does not
expressly deal with the concept of Involuntary Intoxication.

The Respondent argues that

impliedly §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended is all-inclusive with any
defense that deals with the state of mind of the actor.

Respondent took the position that

Involuntary Intoxication must be viewed in light of the codification of a mental illness defense
as amended by the legislature in 1983. Appellant's precise point is that §76-2-305(1) Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as Amended was designed to deal with a mentally ill actor, not an actor who,
by virtue of intoxication of a chemical substance, commits a crime.
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ARGUMENT

I.

INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION IS AN INDEPENDENT DEFENSE SEPARATE
AND APART FROM THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY.
The issue narrowly framed is not what is the state of mind of the actor, but how he or she

came by that state of mind. In the absence of statute, this honorable court should look to a well
established common law.
In order to gain insight into the legislative intent of §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated
1953 as Amended, it is helpful to examine the contents of a report written by a distinguished task
force committee.

The Task Force Committee On Insanity Defense, writing for the 1983

legislature, was a committee composed of elements of the defense and prosecution bar together
with psychiatric professionals.

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

In Committee Recommendations paragraph 5 of that report, a divided committee said in
pertinent part:
The committee recommended that the standard for determining
whether a defendant should be convicted of an offense, although
mentally ill, would be whether fas a result of the mental illness (the
Defendant) lacked a mental state required as an element of the
offense charged'. Mental illness would not otherwise constitute a
defense and the term mental illness would not include voluntary
intoxication. Mental Illness would include a mental disease or
defect
(Emphasis Added By Committee) (See Appendix 3)
Since the Task Force Committee chose to include voluntary intoxication for exclusion
from the defense of insanity, then it follows that Involuntary Intoxication was not meant to be
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brought within the focus of §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended.
The legislative intent was to include precisely what the committee stated; a mental disease
or a defect only. Appellant states that but for the adverse effect of Prozac, the crime of murder
could, or would not, have been committed.
This Court has long recognized the fact that psychotropic drugs, as well as other chemical
substances, may well cause radical human behavior.
The Honorable Justice Durham, in writing for the majority in a case of very similar facts
but different purpose of review said:
"Because prescription drugs are chemical compounds designed to
inter-react with the chemical and psychological processes of the
human body, they almost always will pose some risk of side effects
in certain individuals". 813 P2d 89 Utah (1991) - Grundberg v
Upjohn
The law has and will in the future fail to keep pace with pharmacological technology.
Since the advent of Prozac on the market place in 1987, a firestorm of cases have arisen
asserting that Prozac, in a small percentage of cases, leads otherwise unpredisposed persons to
commit violent acts, to include homicide.
The clear pre-legislative intent was to exclude temporary conditions caused by chemical
substances that alter human behavior.

In any case, by statute, the defense of Involuntary

Intoxication does not have specific mention within §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
Amended, however voluntary intoxication is specifically mentioned by the study committee. The
intention of the 1983 legislature could not envision a 1987 drug that would cause side effects and
induce non-violent persons to commit violent acts as has come before us presently. Therefore,
the logic of trying to fit the square peg concept of Involuntary Intoxication into the round hole

9

of §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended will violate the long-established
principal that an actor is not responsible for his acts if, through no fault of his own, some
intervening extrinsic force causes those actions. The District Court in its ruling failed to discern
that a person who acts from the input of a psychotropic drug by definition, would not be insane
but rather intoxicated.
Appellant well understands that the evidence of his intoxication may well have reduced
his level of mens rea to the level of a lesser included offense, even if he was to have subjected
himself to the jury under the standards provided by the insanity defense statute.
The well established view of excusing a crime when the actor is without fault as to
intoxication is followed in the sister state of Colorado. Colorado courts, as well as the Colorado
Legislature, have addressed the subject of involuntary intoxication both by court decision and
statute. Colorado Statute CRS 18-1-804 says in part...
"...a person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if by
reason of intoxication that is not self-induced at the time he acts,
he lacks the capacity to perform his conduct to the requirements of
the law."
Respondents have heretofore asserted that the so-called "President Reagan/Hinckley Jury
Decision" caused the Utah Legislature to make a major modification in its thinking on the
insanity defense. They correctly assert that irresistible impulse, as followed in Colorado, has
been specifically taken away by the 1983 legislature. To those assertions, the Appellant totally
agrees. Appellant simply states that Involuntary Intoxication is not insanity and therefore the
Legislature did not intend to take away that defense when it made its modification addressing the
so-called Hinckley decision. Since Utah, unlike Colorado and other similarly situated states, is
silent as to whether or not a defense of Involuntary Intoxication is an excuse, then this court
10

would not be in conflict with any legislative pronouncement if it were to follow a more
fundamentally just rule of excuse in cases of Involuntary Intoxication.

11

CONCLUSION
The Appellant, Joseph Charles Gardner, Jr., took Prozac, by prescription rendered by two
physicians. The trier fact would hear evidence that those physicians were never told, nor did
they know, of any possible side effects.
The evidence would clearly show that Appellant was susceptible to the side-effects of the
drug.
Therefore, this Appellant respectfully requests of this court that he be allowed to be heard
before the trier of fact to test the facts of Involuntary Intoxication.
If Appellant was then able to show that he was Involuntarily Intoxicated within the
meanings as heretofore set forth, the trier fact could find that at the time, the Appellant was
intoxicated with Fluoxetine, through no fault of his own, then he would not be criminally
responsible as a matter of law, thereby reversing the standard as previously set forth in the Fifth
Judicial District.
DATED this 28th day of July, 1992.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

ALAN D: BOYACK
BOYACK & BOYACK
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
205 East Tabernacle Street
St. George, UT 84770
(801) 628-2676
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be air-mailed ten (10) true and correct copies, one
with an original signature, of the foregoing brief of Appellant to:
Clerk of the Supreme Court
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
I hereby certify that I caused to be air-mailed eight (8) true and correct copies,
one with an original signature, of the foregoing brief of Appellant to:
Clerk of the Court of Appeals
Ms. Mary T. Noonan
230 South 500 East #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
I hereby certify that I caused to be air-mailed four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing brief of Appellant to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Attorney General
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
KEVIN L. McCLOSKEY - 2152
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed one (1) true and correct copy of the
foregoing brief of Appellant to:
ERIC A. LUDLOW - 5104
Washington County Attorney
W. BRENT LANGSTON - 4614
Deputy Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, UT 84770
DATED this 30th day of July, 1992.

Julie W. Barton-Secretary to Alan D. Boyack
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APPENDIX
1.

Court Order from the Utah Court of Appeals stating transfer of case to Utah Supreme
Court. (Referred from page 5)

2.

Order regarding the Standard Applicable to Defense of Involuntary Intoxication. (Referred
from Page 6)

3.

Task Force Committee on Insanity Defense. (Referred from page 8)
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IN THE UTAH ^OURT^T^PPE^E?
fc'ar/ r 'teonan
Giei> :. 'he Court
jlahCc^rt of Appeals

ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER

Case No. 920087-CA
Joseph Charles Gardner,
Defendant and Appellant.

Upon the Court's own notion, the abcv^e appeal appears to be
within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court.
Now therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above appeal is
transferred to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 44, Utah
R. App. P.
Dated this J\ ™ day of February 1992
FOR THE CQURT:

Mary
lary Tf. froohan

*f

Clerk-bf t h e Court

j

Eric A. Ludlow #5104
Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723

n i r

'S? Jpy

o fi/7 Q ]o
/!
,
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CLta s
DEPlirV
J/V

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER RE: LEGAL STANDARD
APPLICABLE TO DEFENSE OF
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR.,

Criminal No. 901502200

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on
the 26th day of November, 1991, on State's motion for pretrial
determination of the legal standard applicable to the defense of
involuntary intoxication, and the Defendant being present and
represented by Alan D. Boyack, the Plaintiff being represented by
Eric A. Ludlow, Washington County Attorney, and both Counsel having
indicated the desire for a pretrial determination of the applicable
legal standard, and the Court allowed supplemental briefing at the
Defendant's request.

The Court having now reviewed the memoranda

and supplemental memoranda of the parties, hereby issues the
following order pertaining to the legal standards and principles
applicable to the case as follows:
1.

Involuntary intoxication leading to temporary mental

illness can constitute a defense, if brought within the provisions
of Section 76-2-305(1), the Utah Code Annotated, which governs all
mental illness defenses by its very terms. ["It is a defense to a
prosecution... that the defendant, as a result of mental illness,
lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense

nrrmNi-n.^ z. <,rage z or z;
charged.

Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.11]
2.

Irresistible impulse, or a determination of whether a

defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law, is no longer the legal standard applicable to
a mental illness defense in Utah, since the Utah Legislature in
enacting the present law (L. 1983, ch. 49, Section 1) specifically
repealed the former test for insanity, which then included lacking
substantial capacity "to conform [one's] conduct to the
requirements of law."
3.

(L. 1973, ch. 196, Section 76-2-305).

By statute, involuntary intoxication cannot

constitute a complete defense to any crime which contains as an
element of the charge or of a lesser included offense the culpable
mental state of recklessness or of criminal negligence.

[Utah Code

Ann. Section 76-2-306 provides that "...if recklessness or criminal
negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is
unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense."]
4.

Mental illness induced by voluntary intoxication is

not a defense in Utah.

["A person who is under the influence of

voluntary consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or
volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not
excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental
illness."

Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-305(3).]
DATED this

Q -

day of January, 1992.

^

3fl PHILIP EV
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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TASK FORCE COMMITTEE ON INSANITY DEFENSE

A REPORT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Chairman
Ronald N. Boyce, Esq.
Dr. Lincoln Clark
Earl R. Dorius, Esq.
J. Thomas Greene, Esq.
Dr. Bernard Grosser
W. Eugene Hansen, Esq.
Dr. Louis G. Moench
Robert J. Stansfield, Esq.
Dr. Jack L. Tedrow
Robert Van Sciver, Esq.
W. Robert Wright, Esq.
December 27, 1982
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A REPORT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

The problem of insanity and the criminal defendant has been
a matter of concern almost since the inception of criminal prosecutions. Early in the development of the English criminal law
it was ruled that a criminal act could not be punished if the
actor had no more mental capacity than a "wild beast" or did not
know "good from evil." As the judicial and medical communities
acquired more sophistication concerning the mentally disturbed
offender, the courts grappled with the issue of whether the
ancient tests ought to be retained• In 1843, thirteen judges of
the Queens Bench in England promulgated the so-called M'Naghten
test in assessing whether the court that had acquitted Daniel
M'Naghten in the killing of the Secretary to the Prime Minister of
England had acted erroneously.
1.

The M'Naghten Rule.

The test for insanity as articulated by the English judges
was that if a defendant, because of a defect in reason due to
a disease of the mind, did not know the quality of his act or
know that it was wrong, he was entitled to be acquitted* The
standard was adopted at a time when the English courts had not
fully developed the concept of Criminal intent" or the state of
mind necessary to convict of certain offenses. The test of
insanity was independent of the mental state required for the
offense and made the concept of insanity an affirmative defense.
The M'Naghten test was scon adopted in the United States and
became the standard defense of insanity in almost all jurisdictions in this country*
2*

Irresistible Impulse Test.

After M'Naghten had been utilized for a number of years,
some courts supplemented the M'Naghten standard by the so-called
"irresistible impulse" test. That standard provided that if a
criminal actor could not conform his conduct to the right he was
entitled to acquittal. Utah adopted the modification of the
MfNaghten rule and it remained the law in the State of Utah up
until 1973, when the Utah Criminal Code was modified to adopt a
new standard*

APPENDIX 3 (Page 3 of 8)
Other courts continued to struggle with the M'Naghten forirrula and its modifications, and in 1954 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the socalled Durham test for insanity, which would exonerate a defendant if his criminal conduct was the product of a mental disease
or defect. Most states rejected this experimentation as being
too vague and too open-ended, and several years later the court
that first articulated the test rejected it.
3.

ALI and Utah Rule*

In the meantime, the American Lew Institute promulgated a
new test for the insanity defense which was a modified version
of the M•Heighten rule plus irresistible impulse test that had
been in effect in some states including Utah. The new version
further expanded the insanity defense by providing that a person
was not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the actor lacked
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
This standard was adopted by statute in the State of Utah in 1973.
(S 76-2-305, Utah Code Ann, 1953). Further, in the State of Utah,
the burden of proof is on the prosecution, when any evidence of
insanity is raised, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that at
the time the defendant committed the criminal act he was legally
sane. In other states that burden is cast on the defendant*
4.

Utah Law Compared to that in Hinckley,

ttte law in the State of Utah is today identical to the law
existing in the District of Columbia as it was applied in the
criminal prosecution against John Hinckley for the attempted
assassination of President Reagan. Although the Hinckley case has
awakened public concern with the insanity defense, many lawyers,
psychiatrists and scholars have been disenchanted with both the
H'Naghten standard and the American Lav Institute standard for some
time. An extensive review of the legal and psychiatric literature
discussing the insanity defense has been made by the committee.
Although only a small percentage of criminal cases involve instances
where the defense of insanity is claimed, that fact is no justification for perpetuating an erroneous legal standard if, in fact,
an erroneous legal standard has been adopted.
After extensive study, the coitcnittee concluded that the
current test for insanity in the State of Utah was conceptually
erroneous. The error was not so much in the action taken by the
Axr>erican Law Institute as it was in the original concept of the
insanity defense as outlined by the thirteen English judges in
the M'Naghten case. The committee has concluded that the question that the jury or judge ought to address is whether the criminal dtfondunt at the time of the commission of the act had the
required state of mind defined for the commission of the offense.

2-
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If e mental disease or defect precluded the defendant from entertaining the state of mind required for the offense charged, the
defendant vould be entitled to an acquittal on the charged offense
and either a conviction should be entered on a lesser included
offense for which the defendant did have the requisite state of
mind, or if no such state of mind existed, the defendant should
be acquitted altogether.
The defendant who is mentally ill, but not without the power
to form the required criminal intent, ought to be convicted the
same as any other defendant who cosnitted a crime with the
requisite state of mind* Such a conceptualization makes the
claim of mental illness relevant to the state of mind of the
defendant at the time of the commission of the offense, just as
if the defendant had raised defenses other than mental illness,
such as mistake of fact or lack of intent or any other condition
that would cause a judge or jury to find that the defendant did
not commit the offense charged, The insanity defense would no
longer be an affirmative defense to be considered by the trier
of fact independent of the defendant's state of mind. The burden,
of course, would be on the prosecution, as it now is, to show
that the defendant acted with the required criminal intent but
there would be no other burden required to be met by the prosecution,
nor would there" be any other legal concept for the jury to_considerT
This standard has been proposed by eminent scholars throughout
the United States and is reflected in proposed legislation currently before Congress, and legislation that has been before
Congress in one form or another since 1573. This conceptual format has recently been adopted in one fora or another with the
same effect in the Statr .%t>f Idaho, Montana and Alabama.
5.

Committee Recommendation*

The committee recommended that the standard for determining
whether a defendant should be convicted of an offense, although
mentally ill, would be whether
*as a result of the mental illness [the
defendant] lacked the mental state required
as an element of the offense charged."
Mental illness would not otherwise constitute a defense and
the term mental illness would not include voluntary intoxication.
Mental illness would include a mental disease or defect* The
legislation proposed by the committee would authorize a specific
plea of "not guilty due to mental illness" and invoke procedures
for examination of a defendant by qualified experts to determine
the condition of the defendant at the time of the commission of
the offense. The so-called battle of the psychiatrists would
not be entirely eliminated, but it would be significantly reduced

-3-
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because the scope of psychiatric opinion would consider only the
question of whether tha defendant had the required criminal state
of mind, and would not consider what the committee believes to be
the unanswerable question as to volition*
If, however, there ever were a defendant with such a deranged
condition that he absolutely could not control his behavior
(although he knew what he was doing) , his actions would not be
*voluntary acts* within the requirement of the Utah Penal Code
(S 76-1-601(1), Utah Code Km. 1953). It is unlikely, in any
event, that any such person would ever be brought to trial. The
effect of the new test for insanity would be to narrow the defense
from its current broad standard to one examining the mental state
of the defendant at the time that the act was committed, ajid to
harmonize it with the prosecution's burden in every criminal case.
The total abolition of any consideration of mental illness or
insanity would, in the committee's opinion, be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the defendant who raises a defense of mental illness
on the issue of the requisite state of mind cannot be deprived of
the opportunity to offer relevant evidence on the issue. To do so
would treat the mentally ill defendant in a different classification from other defendants who might also raise the defense of the
lack of required state of mind and the disparate treatment would
deny such defendant the equal protection of the law*
The committee also recommends that changes be made in the
Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to harmonize the new
mental illness concept with required court procedures, including
the requirement that notice be given not only of a claim of total
exoneration due to mental illness, but of any claim of diminished
capacity. The defendant could enter a plea that he lacked the
required mental capacity, or in the alternative, could deny the
commission of the offense itself. (This could occur in a homicide
case where a defendant contends that he was so mentally ill as to
be unable to form the required state of mind for the commission
of the offense, but that if he had the required state of mind to
commit the offense, he was privileged to act as he did due to
self-defense.)
6.

'Guilty and Mentally 111" Concept.

The committee believes that the proposed legislation would
significantly improve the administration of justice in instances
where xnental illness is an issue in a criminal prosecution. In
order to deal with the instances where a defendant may be mentally
ill, but not so ill as to be free from criminal responsibility/
the committee proposes that the concept of "guilty and mentally
ill" be added to Utah law to deal with a special class of offenders*
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This concept has currently been adopted in some form by the
legislatures of at least ten states. The committee did not parrot
the legislative format in any state, but tailored the proposal to
what was 'believed to be the best consensus of all the legislation
and one compatible with and in keeping with the available resources
in the State of Utah.
Accordingly, under the Committee proposal, S 77-13-1, Utah
Code Ann, (1953) would be amended to include five possible pleas
to the offense charge^L In addition to the pleas cf'not guilty*,
'guilty and*no contest currently provided for under the statute, a
defendant could enter a plea of Mnot guilty by reason of mental
illness,* or Hguilty and mentally ill." If a defendant enters a
plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness, as previously
explained, he would place in issue the question of whether his
alleged mental illness precluded him from entertaining the state
of mind required for the offense charged. (A defendant would be
allowed to plead not guilty, or in the alternative, not guilty by
reason of mental illness.)
If, on the other hand, a defendant enters a plea of "guilty
and mentally ill," such would not exonerate or excuse defendant's
conduct. The offender found "guilty and mentally ill" is a person
responsible for his criminal activities and held accountable for
such under the law, but who may need specialized treatment*
In view of the additional pleas authorized under the Committee
proposal, the Committee also recommends amendment of S 77-35-21(a)
to allow the jury, in addition to a verdict of guilty or not guilty,
to return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of mental illness,"
"guilty and mentally ill," "not guilty of the crime charged but:
guilty of a lesser included offense," or "not guilty of the crime
charged but guilty of a lesser included offense and mentally ill."
7.

Procedure upon Entry of a Plea of "Guilty and Mentally 111."

If a defendant proffers a plea of guilty and mentally ill,
the Court will hold a hearing to determine the claims of mental
illness, and may order an evaluation of defendant by a suitable
medical facility. If the trial judge finds that the defendant was
mentally ill within the definition of that term, the judge could
then dispose of the offender through various alternatives that
would insure some degree of special custody and/or treatment. If
the judge found that the defendant was not mentally ill, the guilty
plea remains.and .the defendant would be sentenced as any other
offender.
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If the defendant enters a plea of "not guilty by reason of
mental illness,* a jury could also receive evidence that the
defendant, wae currently mentally ill, aa well as at the time of
the commission of the offense, and could return a verdict of
"guilty and mentally ill*. However, the jury's verdict would be
subject to a post-verdict hearing and the court would be required
to confirm that the defendant was, in fact, currently mentally ill.
If the defendant was found to be mentally ill, the court could then
dispose of the case by sentencing the offender to the term provided by law, but the offender could be institutionalized or dealt
with in a more suitable custodial or therapeutic setting.
The criteria for defining a person "guilty and mentally ill,"
and thereby subject to the special disposition by the court, have
been carefully and narrowly drawn so as not to overload the mental
health system which already has limited resources. Only those
offenders who meet a carefully selected mix of criteria would be
eligible for this special disposition. This process allows for
the identification, confirmation and disposition of those special
offenders who should not be excused from criminal responsibility
but who should be recognized as having special needs requiring_a
particular type of custody or treatment.
An offender found guilty and mentally ill would not be
released from serving his sentence unless the Board of Pardons
determined, under criteria normally applied by the Board, that
the person should be released. Additionally, if the Board considers a defendant for parole, it must consult with the treating
facility, and upon recommendation of the facility, will make
continued treatment a condition of parole. 'A person determined
to be guilty and mentally ill who is in need of further institutionalization beyond the period provided by the criminal offense
for which he was convicted should be certified for commitment
through civil process.
Studies that have been done of the application of the "guilty
and mentally ill11 concept in other jurisdictions have shown that
it does not overburden the system, does not provide an excuse for
juries to convict when they shouldn't, and is not used to excuse
a defendant's conduct. The concept appears to have been especially
promising in the State of Michigan.
B.

Conclusion.

The concepts that the Committee has recommended for legislative
adoption have been thoughtfully considered. They are based upon
considerations of scholarly analysis, empirical research reports,
multi-disciplinary input, and sources outside of the Committee,
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itself, which have been carefully and intelligently advanced by
persons interested in this subject matter. It is believed that
the Committee report reflects the best thinking of the legal and
mental health community in the state and is corroborated by
similar conclusions from others in Utah and in other parts of the
country. Therefore/ the Committee respectfully recommends to the
Legislature the adoption of the attached legislation relating to
the issue of insanity and mental illness in criminal cases as
proposed by the Committee.
TASK FORCE COMMITTEE ON INSANITY
DEFENSE
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Chairman
Ronald N. Boyce, Esq*
*Dr. Lincoln Clark
Earl R. Dorius, Esq*
J, Thomas Greene, Esq.
Dr. Bernard Grosser
W. Eugene Hansen, Esq.
**Dr. Louis G. Koench
**Robert J. Stansfield, Esq.
Dr. Jack L. Tedrow
**Robert Van Sciver, Esq.
W. Robert Wright, Esq.

•Concurs in amendment of Section 76-2-3Q5, but dissents from
remainder of Committee Report and Recommendation. The Chairman
believes that this position is sound and very possibly, preferable.
**Dissents from Committee Reoort and Recommendation-7-

